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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS





                                  Appellant
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; WALI SHABAZZ, in his individual
capacity and as an agent of the City of Philadelphia; HUGH
BECKER, in his individual capacity and as an agent of the
City of Philadelphia
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-02186)
District Judge:  Honorable John R. Padova
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 18, 2008
Before: MCKEE, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges





Xavier Mullins appeals the District Court’s judgment entered in appellees’ favor
after a jury trial.  The history of this case and the details of Mullins’s claims are well
2known to the parties and need not be discussed at length.  Briefly, Mullins filed a
counseled civil rights complaint alleging that he was beaten by two deputy sheriffs while
an inmate in the Criminal Justice Center.  After a jury found in favor of the appellees, the
District Court entered judgment in their favor, and Mullins filed a pro se notice of appeal. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
 Mullins argues that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.  “[N]ew trials
because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence are proper only when the record
shows that the jury’s verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on
the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience.” Marra v. Phila. Hous.
Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 309 n.18 (3d Cir. 2007) quoting Williamson v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir. 1991).  Here, Mullins and three inmates testified that
appellee Shabazz began the altercation by punching Mullins.  Mullins and another inmate
testified that Mullins was kicked and hit after being restrained.  Appellees Shabazz and
Becker as well as two other sheriffs testified that Mullins started the fight by punching
Shabazz several times and that it took several sheriffs to bring Mullins down.  They
testified that Mullins was not assaulted once he was restrained.  Thus, the verdict was
based on the credibility of the witnesses.  Credibility determinations are the province of
the factfinder.  Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 506 (3d Cir. 2001).  We may not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury on disputed issues of fact.  Gebhardt v. Wilson
Freight Forwarding Co., 348 F.2d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1965).
3Mullins also argues that he should have been permitted to introduce evidence that
he was found not guilty of assaulting Shabazz.  We review the admission or exclusion of
evidence for an abuse of discretion.  Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d
408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002).  The standards of proof in the criminal case and in this civil case
are different.  That a factfinder did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mullins
assaulted Shabazz does not mean that a civil jury could not find by a preponderance of the
evidence that Mullins started the conflict.  See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One
Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972)(“[An acquittal] does not constitute an
adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden applicable in civil
proceedings.”)  The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mullin’s motion
to admit evidence of his acquittal.
Mullins contends that the District Court should have allowed Mullins to call
Detective Fong, who investigated the incident, as a witness.  At trial, Mullins’s counsel
indicated that he wanted to call Fong only to testify about the limited scope of Fong’s
investigation.  The District Court sustained the appellees’ objection as to relevancy but
noted that Mullins could call Fong on rebuttal; Mullins did not do so.  Mullins now
argues that he was seeking Fong’s testimony on the authenticity of the photographs taken
of Shabazz after the incident and whether Fong’s investigation revealed that Mullins had
assaulted Shabazz.  However, Mullins himself introduced the photographs of Shabazz at
trial, and Fong had no personal knowledge of the events at issue.  The District Court did
4not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Mullins to call Fong.
Mullins argues that he should have been permitted to call three witnesses who
would testify that Shabazz had assaulted them while they were inmates.  However,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a), character evidence is generally not
admissible “for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion.”  Mullins attempts to recharacterize the testimony as challenging Shabazz’s
credibility and not his character.  We reject that characterization and conclude that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing the inmates’ testimony. 
Moreover, we note that two of the inmates pled guilty to assault charges from their
encounters with Shabazz.
Similarly, Mullins argues that the District Court erred in not allowing Mullins’s
witness, Lavond Hill, to testify as to Shabazz’s reputation.  In response to a question from
appellees’ counsel as to how he knew Shabazz, Hill stated that Shabazz had a bad
reputation.  Mullins’s counsel argued that appellees had opened the door to evidence of
Shabazz’s reputation.  The District Court did not allow that testimony.  Again, Mullins
argues that he sought to introduce evidence of Shabazz’s reputation as to his truthfulness. 
Again, we reject that characterization of the proposed testimony and conclude that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying testimony of Shabazz’s reputation. 
By asking Hill how he knew Shabazz, appellees’ counsel did not “open the door” to
admission of such evidence.
5For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by the District Court, we will
affirm the District Court’s judgment.
